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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper examines the relation between regulation and economic performance in the context of 
23 developed economies. We apply a generalisation of the growth accounting model popularized 
by Solow to data over the 2002-2008 period.  In the model, we assume that regulatory quality 
impacts on growth via its impact on total factor productivity growth. We look at three measures of 
regulatory quality, all of which are based on the set of governance indicators developed by the 
World Bank. The model is estimated using a fixed effects as well as a random effects estimation 
strategy. Our findings do lend support for the view that the better the quality of regulation, the 
higher rate of economic growth, but find no support for the view that  the strength of the positive 
growth impact is stronger for countries that rank relatively lower on the regulatory quality scale.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
he link between institutional factors and economic performance has been studied from many angles. 
One that has been explored at length is the role that freedom (economic and political) plays in 
promoting economic performance -  see, for instance,  Doucouliagos and Ulubasoglu (2006), 
Breggon (2003), Klein and Luu (2003), Scully (2002), de Haan and Sturm (2000), Nelson and  Singh (1998). 
Attention has also been given to the relationship between governance and economic performance (Kauffman and 
Kraay, 2002), Hall and Jones (1999), Olson, Sarna and Swamy (1998), and Barro (1997).  In this study, we narrow 
the focus by looking at the effect of the quality of regulation on economic growth in OECD countries. Of course, the 
institutional set-up is a key determinant of the type and quality of the regulatory framework, and of economic 
growth. Although the question of the impact of regulation on economic growth appears to be most relevant in a 
context where there is considerable weakness in the institutional set-up (i.e. developing economies), our focus on 
OECD countries is predicated on the grounds that there can also be perceptibly large differences in the quality of 
regulation among developed countries as well.  
 
 The empirics of growth has long relied on some variant of the basic aggregate growth-accounting model 
developed by Solow (1956), with more generalized approaches incorporating theoretical insights offered by 
endogenous growth theory - see, for instance, Barro (1991, 2000), Barro and Salai-i-Martin (1992), Jones (1995), 
and Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992), AmirKhalkhali and Dar (2003)]. An important element of studies such as 
these is that economic growth is seen as depending not just on traditional variables like factor accumulation, but also 
upon various institutional factors. Typically, in such models, various variables reflecting institutional characteristics 
are included as affecting growth via their impact on total factor productivity – the “Solow” residual. In reality, there 
is no unique variable that can capture the multi-dimensional aspects of a country’s institutional structure; as a result, 
there are potentially many ways of studying the impact of institutions.  Our study modifies the growth-accounting 
model used by Dar and AmirKhalkhali (2003) to examine whether the quality of regulatory framework plays a 
prominent role in explaining differences in growth rates in these countries.  We use measures of the quality of 
regulation that are drawn from the governance indicators developed by the World Bank. Our analysis covers the 
2002-2008 interval for 23 OECD countries for which continuous annual data on these indicators are available, and 
we estimate our model using fixed and random effects methodology. 
 
T 
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 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we discuss the model, the data and the 
estimation techniques. Section III contains a discussion of our empirical findings, while Section IV concludes with a 
summary of the findings.  
 
II. THE EMPIRICAL MODEL, DATA & ESTIMATION  
 
 It is well known from the theory of second-best that the impact of regulation in offsetting welfare reductions 
because of distortions resulting from imperfect markets and externalities is not certain. This is the case even when 
regulators have full information and are guided by public interest. Further, despite significant theoretical advances in 
the literature on regulation, not much is known about the macroeconomic implications. This paper seeks to address this 
gap empirically. The real issue is not so much whether regulation has positive or negative effects on macroeconomic 
outcomes; rather, given that regulation is a fact of life in all economies, the relevant question is whether the quality of 
regulation matters. Are countries in which the institutional framework is more conducive to the formulation and 
implementation of effective regulatory policies also more likely to have better macroeconomic outcomes? This is the 
question posed in this study. 
 
 The difficulty in measuring the quality of regulation has meant that not many studies have been able to 
empirically look at this question, and those that have, have looked at more general governance indicators, and estimated 
their impact of various macroeconomic variables, as noted above. The greater availability of panel data for a large 
number of countries in recent years has given added impetus to the study of this question, especially since the data more 
directly attempt to measure regulatory quality. It is, of course, expected that the study of the potential impact of the 
quality of regulations would be most relevant in poor countries, where the supporting institutional structure is likely to 
be weak. A panel study of developing countries by Jalilian, Kirkpatrick and Parker (2006), for instance, found that 
growth in poor countries is positively related to regulatory quality. That notwithstanding, even among developed 
countries, regulatory quality can vary quite significantly, and thus can lead to variations in economic growth. Hence, in 
this paper, we confine our analysis to twenty three OECD countries. Our aim is to use World Bank regulatory quality 
indicators to assess whether variations in regulatory quality across nations is relevant for explaining differences in their 
growth rates over the 2002-2008 interval.  
 
 The World Bank publishes data on six governance indicators, of which two are more clearly measures of 
regulatory quality. These are the government effectiveness index (GE) and the regulatory quality index (RQ). The raw 
information that are inputs in measuring these indicators are drawn from a variety of sources (national and 
international) – see Kauffman, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2009) for details. As noted by Jalilian et al. (2006, p. 91), RQ and 
GE can be taken as indicators that best reflect the two main dimensions of regulation – the quality of outcomes and the 
process through which regulation comes about. Thus, RQ tries to measure the economic burden on business through 
quantitative regulations, price controls and other interventions, which can be taken as indicators of the quality of 
outcomes; GE, on the other hand, attempts to measure the quality of the public sector bureaucracy, including the 
credibility of government decisions, and thus indicates the quality of the process of regulatory governance.  Both 
indices are constructed such that higher scores (in the -2.5 to +2.5 range), indicate a better quality of regulation. In this 
paper, we use three measures of regulatory quality: GE, RQ, and an aggregate measure, which is a simple arithmetic 
average of GE and RQ, henceforth referred to as GERQ.  Ideally, we would like RQ and GE to be independent of each 
other – that way, each would contain different sets of information. This condition is not met in the sample since the 
correlation coefficient between the two is 0.69, which is not trivial. Nonetheless, there are sufficient differences 
between the two for them to be used separately for assessing the question posed above.    
  
 As noted earlier, the model we adopt is a generalized version of the growth accounting, production function 
model of Solow in which the rate of economic growth is a function of capital and labour accumulation and total 
factor productivity.  The standard growth accounting model can be written as:    
 
GYit = Ait + α1GKit + α2GLit      (1) 
 
where GY is the rate of growth of real GDP, GK is the rate of real capital accumulation, GL is the rate of growth of 
the labour force, and  Ait  measures the rate of total factor productivity growth, or more accurately, the Solow 
residual.   The subscripts i  (i=1,2,...,n) and t  (t=1,2,...,T) index the countries and time periods in the sample, 
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respectively.  Generalizations of the model are usually generated by identifying measurable variables that capture the 
economic and/or political structure of a country, and which affect growth via total factor productivity. For instance, 
two common variables included are those that measure the size of government in the economy and its openness to 
trade, or export expansion – see, for instance, Amirkhalkhali and Dar (2003). Our generalization models total factor 
productivity as depending upon export growth and regulatory quality, as well as upon other unmeasured differences 
across countries. As a result, we can write:  
 
A it =  αi0  +  α3GXit  + α4 R it +  u it                 (2) 
 
where GX is the rate of export growth, R is a regulatory quality index, u is the time and country specific random 
disturbance and  αi0  measures unmeasured cross-country but time-invariant differences. Substituting (2) in (1) yields 
 
GYit =  αi0 + α1GKit + α2GLit  + α3GXit  + α4 R it +  u it                   (3) 
 
 In (3), in the absence of capital stock data, it is not possible to measure the rate of capital formation (GK). 
A common approach is to use other candidates, such as the investment rate (IY); we follow this procedure. We also 
use the growth rate of employment rather than total labour force growth for GL because, given the existence of 
persistent episodes of unemployment in these countries over the sample period, employment more accurately 
captures the extent of labour utilization. Our prior expectations are that all slope coefficients are positive (or, at least, 
non-negative). We estimate (3) using each of the three measures of regulatory quality R: GERQ= (GE +RQ)/2, GE 
and RQ. An interesting question is the strength of the impact of regulatory quality on growth, and how this impact 
varies across countries. To examine this, we construct the elasticity of growth with respect to regulatory quality. One 
might expect that the greatest beneficial growth impact from regulatory improvements occur in a situation where the 
quality of regulation is low to begin with. This would imply that the growth elasticity is inversely related to 
regulatory quality.   
 
Table 1: Averages of Variables (2002-2006): OECD Countries 
Country GY IY GL GERQ GE RQ GX 
Australia 3.26 27.53 1.07 1.71 1.81 1.61 -5.49 
Austria 2.37 22.70 2.45 1.67 1.77 1.57 -0.9 
Belgium 1.96 21.42 1.28 1.48 1.67 1.30 -1.90 
Canada 2.38 21.64 1.96 1.71 1.85 1.55 -4.20 
Denmark 1.33 21.31 0.53 1.95 2.14 1.75 -1.91 
Finland 2.86 21.01 0.96 1.88 2.08 1.69 -1.69 
France 1.62 20.44 0.67 1.41 1.61 1.20 -1.69 
Germany 1.20 17.59 0.79 1.52 1.55 1.50 0.39 
Greece 3.87 21.68 1.59 0.84 0.81 0.89 -3.14 
Iceland 4.12 25.52 2.99 1.70 1.91 1.49 0.54 
Ireland 4.30 24.98 1.13 1.65 1.61 1.69 -0.57 
Italy 0.77 21.14 1.69 0.80 0.66 0.95 -5.41 
Japan 1.41 23.36 -0.05 1.18 1.30 1.05 -0.09 
Luxembourg 3.92 21.43 3.29 1.76 1.78 1.74 1.86 
Netherlands 1.94 19.76 0.91 1.78 1.85 1.72 -0.99 
New Zealand 2.95 23.51 2.25 1.72 1.76 1.68 -0.99 
Norway 2.37 20.84 1.48 1.63 1.92 1.34 -4.21 
Portugal 0.81 23.73 0.24 1.12 1.07 1.17 -1.67 
Spain 3.02 28.97 3.27 1.29 1.34 1.25 -1.74 
Sweden 2.57 18.36 1.161 1.76 1.94 1.57 -0.81 
Switzerland 2.04 21.40 1.16 1.77 1.95 1.59 -0.77 
UK 2.31 17.18 1.04 1.72 1.73 1.70 -2.43 
US 2.31 19.37 0.92 1.57 1.60 1.54 -1.17 
Notes: GY = annual real GDP growth (%); IY = investment to GDP  ratio; GL is labour force growth (%); GERQ= (GE+RQ)/2, 
where GE is the government effectiveness index and RQ is the regulatory quality index; GX= export growth rate. 
 
 
In estimating (3), it can be noted that, since the intercept αi0 is country-specific, the use of least squares by 
pooling the data would be inappropriate. In light of this, the two options that suggest themselves are fixed effects and 
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random effects estimation. If we treat the αi0 as random variables, which are independent of the regressors, then random 
effects estimation is efficient. If, on the other hand, we treat them as fixed parameters, then fixed effects estimation is 
consistent regardless of whether the fixed effects are correlated with the regressors or not. However, fixed effects 
estimation is not efficient.  In this scenario, one would opt for random effects estimation. However, if the αi0.are 
correlated with the regressors, which is often quite likely, then random effects estimation is inconsistent, and there is 
case for using the fixed effects estimator.  Our approach involves estimating the model (3) using both fixed and random 
effects estimation, and then using them to test for the appropriate estimation technique. Specifically, we can apply the 
standard F statistic to test the fixed effects assumption, and the Hausman Chi-square statistic to then test whether the 
null hypothesis that the random effects approach is supported by the evidence.   
 
 As noted  before, the sample used in this study consists of data for twenty three  industrialized countries 
which are members of OECD: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and  the United States. The data span the 2002-2008 interval and were obtained 
from various issues of Economic Outlook published by OECD and International Financial Statistics published by 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). Table 1 above presents averages of the variables used in this study.  It is quite 
evident that even among this group of industrial countries, there are fairly large differences in the quality of regulation, 
as can be seen by examining the three indicators, GE, RG and GERQ.  Both the GE and RQ index suggest that 
countries such as Greece and Italy have the poorest regulatory quality, while countries like Finland, Denmark and 
Luxembourg score the highest in this regard. Annual rates of economic growth also shows much variability across the 
panel, ranging from a low average of only 0.85 percent in Italy to a high of 3.9 percent in Luxembourg.  It does appear 
to be the case from casual examination of the data in Table 1 that economic growth is positively associated with 
regulatory quality. We explore this in greater detail in the next section. 
 
III. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
 
 The estimates of equation (3) are reported in Table 2 below. Regardless of the regulatory measure used, the 
random effects estimates indicate that a higher quality of regulation leads to stronger economic growth, and the 
relevant coefficients are significant at the 5 percent with the GERQ and GE measures. With fixed effects, the same is 
true of the coefficients of GERQ and GE measures, but the coefficient of RQ is negative, but highly insignificant. As 
well, capital accumulation and labour force growth impact positively on growth in all regressions, and the 
coefficients significant at 1 percent or less. The coefficient of export growth has the expected positive sign, but is not 
significant at the 10 percent level except in the case of using fixed effects with GE measure.    
 
Table 2: Fixed Effects & Random Effects Estimates (N=23, T=7) 
 Fixed Effects Random Effects Fixed Effects Random Effects Fixed Effects Random Effects 
Constant * -2.602 
(-1.945) 
* -2.683 
(-2.067) 
* -1.961 
(-1.461) 
GERQ 2.034 
(1.954) 
1.072 
(2.246) 
* * * * 
GE * * 2.112 
(2.285) 
0.974 
(2.530) 
* * 
RQ * * * * -0.165 
(-0.096) 
0.840 
(1.530) 
IRATE 0.1750 
(2.553) 
0.130 
(2.740) 
0.205 
(2.941) 
0.137 
(2.821) 
0.157 
(2.287) 
0.121 
(2.569) 
GL 0.3766 
(4.272) 
0.406 
(4.324) 
0.384 
(4.385) 
0.410 
(4.385) 
0.362 
(3.568) 
0.403 
(4.256) 
GX 0.0546 
(1.597) 
0.047 
(1.222) 
0.058 
(1.670) 
0.047 
(1.244) 
0.040 
(1.235) 
0.047 
(1.225) 
R-squared 0.45 0.26 0.47 0.27 0.44 0.26 
F (22, 134) 2.04 * 2.27 * 1.94 * 
Chi-square  * 1.24 * 2.24 * 0.64 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are t ratios; the F statistic tests for the fixed effects model  vs. the OLS model (null hypothesis); 
while the Chi-square statistic tests for random effects (null hypothesis) vs. fixed effects; for variable definitions, see notes to 
Table 1; the dependent variable in all equations is GY, the annual growth rate of real GDP. 
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It is interesting to note that the estimated coefficients of all the regulation variables (as well as the 
investment rate variable) are all smaller in magnitude under the random effects specification. This raises the question 
as to which of the two models gives better estimates. First, note that the F statistic in all fixed effects equations is 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level. This would imply that the data strongly support the fixed effects 
specification vis-a-vis the pooled OLS model. This means that unobserved heterogeneity is present and least squares 
estimation is biased and inconsistent. On the other hand, the Hausman Chi-square test statistic is not statistically 
significant at even the 10 percent level of significance in all cases. This finding thus supports the validity of the 
random effects model.   
 
 Returning to the estimated effects of regulation, we can give a more precise interpretation to their 
magnitude. Specifically, we can calculate the growth elasticities with respect to regulation. These estimates are 
provided in Table 3 below. Note first that the estimated growth elasticities average in the 0.6-0.8 range, depending 
upon the regulation measure used. Thus, on average, improved regulation does not have a very strong impact on 
growth, although that impact is not trivial because the elasticities vary quite significantly, suggesting that country-
specific estimates could paint a different picture. Thus, the elasticities range from lows in the 0.19-0.23 range to 
highs in the 1.2-1.6 range. The countries at the high end are: Denmark, Italy, Portugal and Germany while the 
country at the bottom of the spectrum is Greece, regardless of the regulatory measure used. In any case, only the four 
countries listed above (out of a total of 23) have elasticities in excess of unity. So the impact of regulation is 
generally not strong for most countries the OECD group. As well, note that Greece is the country which ranks the 
lowest in terms of regulatory quality, regardless of the measure used, while Denmark is among the countries with the 
highest regulatory quality. It would, therefore, appear that countries with the poorest regulatory quality do not appear 
to benefit most in terms of growth from an improvement in regulatory quality. To assess this more rigorously, we 
computed the correlations between the growth elasticities and each of our regulation measures.  Our results found 
that these correlations are every weak and highly insignificant statistically, implying that the impact of regulation on 
growth is independent of regulation itself. Overall, thus, our findings suggest that improved regulatory quality does 
appear to benefit growth in developed countries, but the impact is not very strong, except for a handful of countries, 
and the strongest impact does not appear to be in those countries which are at the lower end of the regulatory quality 
spectrum.  
 
 
Table 3: Growth Elasticities: 2002-2008 
Regulation measure Mean Elasticity Standard Deviation Maximum Minimum 
GERQ 0.81 0.34 1.57 0.23 
GE 0.77 0.32 1.57 0.20 
RQ 0.60 0.27 1.21 0.19 
 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
This paper empirically examined the impact of the quality of regulation on economic growth on OECD 
countries over the 2002-2008 interval, using indicators of regulatory quality developed  by the World Bank.  Our 
estimates provide support for\the view that the quality of regulation has a positive impact on growth, although the 
strength of that evidence varied across indicators. However, the prior expectation that the strength of the favourable 
impact of improved regulatory quality, as measured by the elasticity of growth with respect to regulation, would 
likely be greater for countries with a relatively poorer quality was not supported by the evidence.  How robust these 
findings are, is a matter for further investigation. One area for further analysis is the estimation methodology. We 
have used fixed and random effects estimation since they take into account unobserved cross-country heterogeneity. 
In that regard, a random coefficients approach would likely be a better estimation strategy since such an approach 
can be shown to be a more appropriate statement of the law relating growth to its determinants. With random 
coefficients, all coefficients vary across countries, and this would mean that regulation impacts growth not just 
through its impact on total factor productivity, but through individual factor productivity as well. Additionally, 
applying such an approach by grouping countries according to the level of regulatory quality would also provide 
more insight on how regulation impacts on growth.  
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